A new Council cooperation mechanism on the external dimension of the EU is to be introduced in 2022. A confidential document obtained by migration-control.info shows that the mechanism reflects broader trends that have been shaping the EU's external dimension for years.
Following the European Council's conclusions of 16 December 2021, which called on the Council to 'closely monitor and, if necessary, give further impetus to the rapid and effective implementation of the EU's external migration policy', a leaked Council document of 30 December 2021 provides further details on how this objective will be operationalised. The document foresees the launch, within the next twelve months, of an operational coordination mechanism on the external dimension [to the EU] of migration, to be placed within the broader trends shaping European external migration policy.
The so-called 'Operational Coordination Mechanism for the External Dimension of Migration' (MOCADEM) will ensure the coordination and monitoring of the implementation of the operational aspect of the EU's external migration policy. MOCADEM operates under the leadership of the Council Presidency and the strategic guidance of the Committee of Permanent Representatives (Coreper), which is also responsible for the political monitoring of the implementation of the agreements that are part of the European operational cooperation on migration. MOCADEM will prepare and propose operational measures concerning the means and resources to be mobilised for the EU to achieve its objectives in the area of migration control in relation to third countries.
Where the EU's migration relations with a third country require coordination and rapid action, the Presidency may organise round tables under the new cooperation mechanism, bringing together various Council bodies, such as the Working Party on External Aspects of Migration or the Working Party on Visas, and other relevant bodies, such as interested Member States, EU agencies or experts. The Round Tables will prepare actions that can be proposed to Coreper.
The new mechanism underlines the important role that Coreper and the Council have acquired in the context of migration-related issues, which are increasingly contentious among EU Member States. MOCADEM is based on the Council Implementing Decision (EU) No 2018/1993 establishing the Integrated Political Crisis Response Mechanism (IPCR). Article 6(1) of this decision places COREPER at the centre of the coordination mechanisms of the IPCR:
"In order to ensure the coherence of the Union's policies and actions, COREPER shall be the default level entrusted with monitoring the implementation of the provisions of the IPCR. The Presidency must immediately provide COREPER with information on the main aspects of the crisis and the planned approach".
Experts from the EU institutions described Coreper as 'the place where agreements are made'. Coreper began as a diplomatic forum with regular meetings to prepare the Council of Ministers. As a result of the travel restrictions affecting the work of the EU institutions, the role and importance of Coreper has continued to grow. Meanwhile, Coreper meetings are regularly criticised by organisations for their lack of transparency and composition, being 'made up of diplomats or unelected officials who (often) meet in private'.
Contents:
1 MOCADEM and broader trends in the EU's external dimension
1.1 Catalysing and rationalising bilateral migration interests
1.2 Operational focus
1.3 Instrumentalisation of humanitarian aid?
1.4 Long-term management schemes based on 'emergency' strategies
MOCADEM and broader trends in the EU's external dimension
In addition to what has already been mentioned, many of the points raised in the leaked Council document reflect trends in EU cooperation on external migration. These include a focus on pooling and streamlining Member State (MS) strategies, an increasing operational focus, the use of other policy/management areas to achieve migration control objectives, and the use of crisis legal frameworks in non-critical contexts.
Catalysing and streamlining bilateral migration interests
Strengthening cooperation between the different actors involved in the EU's external dimension has been a key priority of the various policy frameworks dealing with this dimension since the launch of the Global Approach to Migration (GAM) in 2005, the first comprehensive framework for the EU's external dimension. Under the GAM, so-called Mobility Partnerships (MPs) were launched. These partnerships constitute an institutional umbrella under which EU member states bundle incentives and negotiation strategies, mainly to obtain concessions regarding deportation from a so-called third country.
This emphasis on initiating Member States' cooperation with so-called third countries has been a recurring element in other policy strategies, such as the Common Agendas on Migration and Mobility (CAMMs) promoted under the Global Approach to Migration and Mobility in 2011, as well as the so-called Migration Pacts introduced under the New Partnership Structure with third countries following the so-called migration crisis of 2015. The Migration Pacts aimed to ensure a more concerted effort in the external dimension of the EU, bringing together the different strengths of EU Member States to achieve a common strategy with 16 long-term and five short-term priority countries. Taken together, these pacts aimed to "maximise the synergy between the Union's internal and external policies".
At the same time, the role of the EU Migration Liaison Officer (EMLO) was created. Based in EU delegations, the EMLO coordinates the various member states in their migration-related initiatives. Despite these efforts, the New Pact (i.e. the EU's most recent migration policy framework) reiterated the need to strengthen cooperation between EU member states. The New Pact states: 'Efforts at EU level alone are not enough: effective coordination between the EU plan and Member States is essential at all levels: bilateral, regional and multilateral. Consistent communication between the EU and its Member States on migration, on the one hand, and cooperation with partners, on the other, have proved crucial in demonstrating the EU's shared commitment. In particular, the EU should build on the experience and privileged relationships some Member States have with strategic partners - experience has shown that the key to success is the full involvement of Member States in EU partnerships on migration, including through the pooling of funds and expertise through the various EU Trust Funds.
The launch of MOCADEM must therefore be seen in the context of the EU's ongoing efforts to develop a more coherent and streamlined strategy among its member states. This is important not only because it is expected to lead to greater influence on a so-called third country, but also because EU member states, pursuing their bilateral interests, have in the past sidelined EU initiatives, especially when negotiating deportations. This was the case, for example, with Senegal, where the failure of EU efforts to establish a migration partnership following the Canary Islands crisis is well documented.
Operational focus
MOCADEM's emphasis on facilitating operational activities highlights another trend in the EU's external dimension. Since the conclusion of the EU's infamous pact with Turkey in 2016 - a non-binding political agreement in the form of a press statement - informal coordination on migration policy has once again become the modus operandi, especially with regard to deportations. In this context, any form of bilateral and multilateral cooperation in so-called third countries is often fiercely contested, which makes it easier to conclude informal and non-transparent agreements, as civil society and social movements are often unaware of them. Following the agreement with Turkey, the EU has concluded informal operational agreements on returns with a number of states, including Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Ethiopia, Gambia, Guinea and Côte d'Ivoire. The recent cooperation with Iraq on the self-proclaimed voluntary return of people stranded at the Polish and Belarusian borders sets another dangerous precedent on the road to opaque cooperation on return policies that violate the EU's own legal guarantees against refoulement.
If the EU's deal with Turkey has been heavily criticised for undermining democratic legitimacy, failing to guarantee human rights and worsening protection standards, informal readmission agreements have been even more severely criticised. The European Parliament, which adopted a report on the issue in 2021, noted that informal readmission agreements entail
"(...) the absence of adequate reporting, monitoring, evaluation and accountability mechanisms [that] can be used to monitor individual cases and respond to potential violations, as well as the absence of effective judicial remedies for persons whose rights have allegedly been violated. Members stress that the rights of asylum-seekers are inherently dependent on the possibility of bringing alleged human rights violations before a court.
Meanwhile, the focus on operational cooperation has shifted beyond cooperation on return. Based on the New Pact, the EU Action Plan against Smuggling of Migrants adopted in 2021 states that so-called Operational Partnerships against Smuggling should be established.
According to the Action Plan, these partnerships should be an integral part of 'comprehensive [EU] migration partnerships with countries of origin and transit'. Operational partnerships against trafficking in human beings will include some or all of the following aspects: legal capacity building; ensuring the implementation of legal structures through the development of policies, strategies and action plans at national, regional and continental levels; capacity building of national and local authorities; establishment or strengthening of coordination centres; capacity building of partner countries in border management; providing operational support for law enforcement and judicial cooperation; strengthening cooperation with third countries against identity theft and false documents; launching awareness-raising campaigns; assisting in addressing security issues related to the smuggling of migrants; and, finally, continuing dialogue and coordination on what is referred to here as "the new phenomenon of the instrumentalisation of migration by states".
Instrumentalising humanitarian aid?
The leaked document on the establishment of the new 'Operational Coordination Mechanism for the External Dimension of Migration' emphasises the importance of using other policy areas as leverage to achieve the objectives of controlling migration to third countries. The document describes 'operational actions' as follows
'Any action which, in the context of the EU's relations with third countries, can contribute to the achievement of the Union's objectives in the field of migration, including: a political or diplomatic approach; an action in support of the third country concerned, including capacity building or humanitarian assistance; the mobilisation of all available leverage, e.g. financial support or visa management or other policy areas'. (emphasis ours)
The use of different political and administrative spheres to achieve migration control objectives vis-à-vis so-called third countries has been an integral part of the EU's external dimension of migration since the 1999 Tampere Council, which emphasised during the Kosovo crisis that a 'comprehensive' approach to migration must also address political, developmental and human rights issues in self-proclaimed 'third countries'. What is new and worrying in the leaked MOCADEM document, however, is that for the first time humanitarian aid is explicitly mentioned as an action that can contribute to achieving EU policy objectives.
In the aftermath of the so-called migration crisis in 2015, there was a new emphasis on the use of areas not necessarily related to migration policy, but humanitarian policy was explicitly excluded. For example, the 2016 New Partnership Framework states that: "Neighbourhood, development and trade are not the only relevant policies to support the pacts, even if they are considered potentially effective. No administrative policy should be excluded from this approach'. At the same time, in a footnote, this document clearly underlines that humanitarian policies are excluded from this condition, in line with humanitarian principles.
Similarly, the New 2020 Pact proposes to formalise some of the incentive mechanisms achieved by linking migration to other areas of governance, but explicitly excludes humanitarian policy from migration-related decisions. The New Pact envisages the introduction of two formalised contractual mechanisms. The first is the EU Commission's annual evaluation of visas under the EU Visa Code, which can propose restrictive or favourable visa measures depending on the level of cooperation on return. The second, proposed in the New Pact and further elaborated in the Regulation on Asylum and Migration Management (RAMM), provides for an analysis by the Commission which, if the EU's return targets with a particular third country are not met, could propose measures against that country, including a general review of relations. Importantly, the new pact reiterates that humanitarian assistance must be excluded from the conditions. It states that: 'The EU's role in addressing emergencies and humanitarian needs is based on the principles of humanity, impartiality, neutrality and independence'. This paradigm shift thus officially sets a dangerous precedent that further undermines humanitarian principles and must be closely monitored. All in all, it is part of a trend to expand the areas of bilateral cooperation subordinated to EU migration control strategies.
Long-term management schemes based on 'emergency' strategies
Finally, the functioning of MOCADEM is constructed by emulating the European Integrated Political Crisis Response Mechanism, as stated in Council Executive Decision (EU) No. 2018/1993. However, the leaked Council document emphasises that MOCADEM "differs in its purpose, as the new mechanism is intended to deal with migration relations with third countries" - and not with crises.
This is not the first time in the context of migration policy that emergency and crisis instruments have been mobilised outside their original scope in order to bend legal frameworks to pursue political and strategic interests. Another striking example in this direction is the adoption of the European Trust Fund for Africa (EUTF), which reportedly relied on the (legal) declaration of 'crisis' in 26 African countries for the duration of its implementation. Only by invoking this legal fiction was it legally possible to launch the EUTF.
In order to make sense of the ways in which crisis is used - both in the legal context and at the discursive level - to construct routine practices of containment and control, the following words from the scholars Julien Jeandesboz and Polly Pallister-Wilkins are useful:
'When we analyse crisis scenarios and routine procedures of control, we find that the two, crisis and routine, are more profitably conceived as relational notions with coinciding repertoires of practices rather than as disjointed epistemological assumptions in the study of security, migration and border politics.
The relational notions of crisis and habit are once again evident here: legal frameworks designed to respond to 'crises' are used to enable the operationalisation of the everyday governance of external migration, which paradoxically produces multiple crises for those affected, both personally and collectively. These routine practices in the EU's external dimension are based on multiple building blocks, including those discussed here, which have been reinforced over time.
The first European presidency to use MOCADEM is France, which took over in January this year. A document published by Statewatch summarises the migration priorities that France will pursue during its presidency. France is pushing for a more securitised approach, embracing the management logic of containment and focusing relations with third countries on return and readmission issues. In this way, the MOCADEM instrument is likely to function as another tool to unfurl the sails towards the same destination: an effort to build concerted and routine practices of racist containment.
